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ABSTRACT: Mutation breeders in the 1960s seemed poised to use atomic energy to speed up 
mutation rates in plants in order to develop new crop varieties, for the benefit of all people. 
Although skepticism had slowed this work in the United States, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) nurtured the scientific field, its community of experts, and an imagined version 
of the future that put humans in control of their destiny. The IAEA acted as a center of disse-
mination and support for experts and ideas even when they had fallen from favor elsewhere. 
Through the lens of the IAEA, plant breeding bore the appearance of a socially progressive, 
ultra-modern science destined to alleviate population pressures. Administrators at the IAEA also 
were desperate for success stories, hoping to highlight mutation plant breeding as a potential 
solution to the world’s ills. The community of mutation plant breeders gained a lifeline from 
the consistent clarion call from the Vienna-based agency to use atomic energy to understand 
the natural world and quicken its pulse with radioisotopes.
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1. Introduction
The story of the Green Revolution, with its hybrid strains of rice and wheat 
fending off the population crisis in the 1970s, was slightly tarnished by 
the suicide of a plant breeder in India. Vinod Shah had been working in 
an institution led by his country’s most celebrated scientist, Monkombu 
Sambasivan Swaminathan, dubbed the «guru of the Green Revolution». 
Swaminathan had been instrumental in bringing to India the «miracle» 
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wheat developed in Mexico that grew so well on the farmlands of India and 
Pakistan, and had used radioactive sources to speed up the natural mutation 
rates of plants. He claimed to have used radiation to increase the protein 
content of wheat. The work suggested that radioisotopes held the key to 
manipulating natural processes for the benefit of all, and it strengthened 
the connections being drawn, especially by academics and politicians in 
industrialized countries, between scientific research and the development 
of the Global South 1. When Shah killed himself in 1972, he left a note that 
implied that the apparent protein result had taken on a life of its own, with 
such obvious political importance that it had become virtually impossible 
in India to question the optimistic claims emerging from the scientific 
work. Addressing Swaminathan, he wrote that «a lot of unscientific data 
are collected and passed on to you to fit your line of thinking». The claim 
of increased protein content was later demonstrated to be exaggerated at 
best, completely spurious at worst 2.
In the 1960s, mutation breeders such as Swaminathan seemed poised 
to use atomic energy to speed up mutation rates in plants in order to 
develop new crop varieties, for the benefit of all people. The US had once 
been the center of such work. But in the 1960s, skepticism had slowed this 
work in the US and tempered enthusiasm. Yet Swaminathan and other 
scientists like him enjoyed the backing of a community of experts at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who encouraged them to 
build up mutation plant breeding in their countries and to connect their 
research to problems facing the developing world. Despite considerable 
opposition, and lacking evidence that atomic agriculture was worth the 
investment, the IAEA nurtured a scientific field, a community of experts, 
and an imagined version of the future that put humans in control of their 
destiny, powered by the atom.
 1. Scholars in recent decades have connected these notions of development to ideological 
competition, cultural chauvinism, and neocolonialism. Escobar, Arturo. Encountering 
development: the making and unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press; 2011; Moon, Suzanne. Takeoff or self-sufficiency? Ideologies of development in Indonesia, 
1957-1961. Technology and Culture. 1998; 39(2): 187-212; Cullather, Nick. The hungry world: 
America’s cold war battle against poverty in Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2010; 
Perkins, John H. Geopolitics and the green revolution: wheat, genes and the cold war. New 
York: Oxford University Press; 1997.
 2. Dr. Vinod Shah’s protest by suicide. Nature. 19 May 1972; 237:130. See also Hanlon, Joseph. Top 
food scientist published false data. New Scientist. 7 Nov 1974: 436-437.
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The present essay highlights the role of the IAEA to act as a center 
of dissemination and support for experts and ideas even when they had 
fallen from favor elsewhere. The IAEA periodically injected enthusiasm and 
support for various atomic-related fields in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, especially mutation plant breeding. Marginalized by scientific 
communities in their home countries and often unable to acquire sustained 
funding, mutation plant breeders used the IAEA as a lifeline, to bolster the 
credibility of their research programs and to gain high-profile attention for 
their methods. Despite widespread views among scientists of its dubious 
value, mutation plant breeding bore the appearance —through the lens of the 
IAEA— of a socially progressive, ultra-modern science destined to alleviate 
population pressures. Administrators at the IAEA took this support so far 
that they were desperate for success stories, hoping to highlight mutation 
plant breeding as a potential solution to the world’s ills. The science of 
mutation plant breeding, rarely a mainstream or even highly respected field 
in the US and Europe, gained strength from the consistent clarion call from 
the Vienna-based agency to use atomic energy to understand the natural 
world and quicken its pulse with radioisotopes.
2. Favors from nature
Mutation plant breeding’s most compelling argument was that it made 
humans shapers of their own destinies. The notion was similar to that 
espoused by the Russian Trofim Lysenko, who insisted that humans did not 
have to wait for favors from nature. Real science was progressive, in which 
human hands shaped the course of natural evolution. Lysenko attacked 
Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics, with their emphasis on 
unpredictable mutations. Mutation plant breeders took a different approach 
—they accepted randomness of mutations but empowered themselves by 
hastening the process with intensive radiation. In the 1950s, the American 
scientist Lloyd Berkner, president of Associated Universities, captured this 
ethos when he marveled at mutation crop breeding: «It is as though, for 
evolutionary purposes, we had collapsed a thousand years into one» 3. 
 3. Manchester, Harland. The new age of atomic crops. Popular Mechanics. Oct 1958: 106-110, 
282-288 (108).
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Design by humans, and the ability to use science as a tool for social and 
economic progress, lent special importance to mutation breeding. Before the 
American Hermann J. Muller had shown in 1927 that X-Rays could induce 
mutations in fruit flies, geneticists often spoke of genes as untouchable, 
not subject to influence from the environment. Radiation changed that 
conversation because it seemed to put the power of design back into the 
hands of scientists 4. Muller’s 1927 work, published prominently in Science, 
became the foundational text for modern mutation plant breeding 5. «If 
mutations can be produced artificially and at will in plants and animals, the 
work of the animal and plant breeder will be greatly accelerated» wrote The 
Scientific Monthly in 1928. «We shall no longer need an empirical genius… 
but shall obtain our results by quantitative laboratory methods» 6. 
Optimistic statements about design seemed to be backed up by research. 
When plant breeders subjected crop plants at various stages of development 
to X-Ray and radium treatment, they found entirely new mutations, sparking 
a fire of interest among amateur gardeners and academic scientists alike 7. 
At the University of California, T. H. Goodspeed claimed to have gotten 
results similar to Muller’s from the irradiation from tobacco plants. University 
of Missouri botanist Lewis J. Stadler presented evidence in the late 1920s 
of conspicuous seedling characters for corn and barley. After a meeting 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science —at which 
Muller received an award of $1,000 for having presented the most notable 
paper— one writer reflected:
«It is agreed on all sides at the gatherings of scientific men that the past 
year has been one of revolution in the study of heredity among living things, 
comparable with 1859, when Darwin published the Origin of Species, and 
1900, the year of the rediscovery of Mendel’s law» 8.
 4. Chemical substances, especially colchicine, also induced mutations, and this excited the interests 
of plant breeders as well. Curry, Helen Anne. Making marigolds: colchicine, mutation breeding, 
and ornamental horticulture, 1937-1950. In: Campos, Luis; von Schwerin, Alexander, eds. Making 
mutations: objects, practices, contexts. Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte; 
2010, p. 259-284.
 5. Muller, H. J. Artificial transmutation of the gene. Science. 1927; 66 (1699): 84-87. 
 6. Advances in biophysics. The Scientific Monthly. 1928; 26 (2): 189-190. 
 7. Curry, Helen Anne. From garden biotech to garage biotech: amateur experimental biology in 
historical perspective. The British Journal for the History of Science. 2014; 47 (3): 539-565.
 8. Stadler, L. J. Mutations in barley induced by X-rays and radium. Science. 1928; 68 (1756): 186-187.
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But would this really live up to the enthusiasm expressed by Muller 
and so many others?
One of those who cared deeply about these questions was Swedish 
botanist and geneticist Åke Gustafsson, later dubbed the «father of mutation 
breeding» 9. In the 1930s, spurred on by Muller’s excitement, Gustafsson did 
his doctoral work on artificial mutations in barley. Although Stadler had 
demonstrated that it was possible to induce mutations, he had concluded that 
the proportion of deleterious mutations made radiation seem impractical. 
Gustafsson, on the other hand, reasoned that a huge amount of wasted 
crop material would be worth the gain of a good mutant. His work spoke 
directly to the interests of the Swedish government in maximizing yields on 
limited amounts of arable land, especially when Sweden’s weak-stemmed 
barley crops began to be replaced by stiff-stemmed plants developed by 
Gustafsson. 
In public discourse, the work of Muller and Gustafsson took on the 
tone of social progress through directed evolution 10. The magazine Popular 
Mechanics, many years later, reported that Gustafsson «in a few years found 
that they could step up nature’s mutation rate as much as a thousandfold». 
His name was attached to radiation-induced successes, such as a new 
mustard plants that yielded ten percent more vegetable oil per acre than 
existing varieties, and the «Ray Pea» (named for the X-Ray), with a pod 
some thirty percent larger than its parents. The language of journalists put 
scientists in control of processes, with red apples «forced out of trees which 
bore yellow fruit, and russet pears from trees that bore smooth ones» 11. 
Radiation was a new tool —for penetrating into the genetic material and 
transforming species.
With cooperation from geneticists, the atomic bomb itself could be cast as 
a progressive improvement tool. American botanists brought seeds of barley, 
wheat, and oats with them to the South Pacific for a series of atomic bomb 
tests in 1946. The seeds exposed to one particular explosion —codenamed 
ABLE— were then grown in Arizona. The mutants observed were collected 
 9. van Harten, A. M. Mutation breeding: theory and practical applications. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; 1998, p. 55. 
 10. Leningrad Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The situation in biological science. 
Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House; 1949, p. 34; Gustafsson, Åke. Marxist genetics 
at the Stockholm Botanical Congress. Journal of Heredity. 1951; 42 (2): 55-59 (55).
 11. Manchester, Harland. The new age of atomic crops. Popular Mechanics. 1958; Oct: 106-110, 
282-288 (288).
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and planted at various field stations. State College of Washington botanist 
Luther Smith discovered that at least one of these mutants was dominant. 
It was a golden-colored durum wheat, and the dominant gene was passed 
on according to Mendelian laws. Here was a clear case of atomic radiation 
introducing an important and viable gene (not just a damaged chromosome) 
into nature 12.
Scientists at the dawn of the atomic age used such findings to argue 
that mutation plant breeding might provide the key to guided evolutionary 
change. A member of Gustafsson’s group in Sweden, Diter von Wettstein, 
claimed that «by radiation we can get almost anything out of a plant we 
really want». He said that most food plants were «old fashioned» needing 
reconstruction. «We now have an instrument with which we can rebuild all 
the food plants in the world» 13. It was powerful imagery —rebuilding nature. 
It took hold in press coverage of atomic energy applications in agriculture, 
implying that the atom would help design, shape, and rebuild nature. 
In reality, although this work arguably made contributions to the 
development of new beneficial mutations, its main justification was in 
studying the effects of radiation exposure from nuclear weapons and fallout. 
Even when substantially supported, little of the work on radiation-induced 
mutation was specifically oriented toward developing new varieties. The 
most extensive research program for plant irradiation was at Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, in New York, where Arnold H. Sparrow had begun 
a large-scale program on what was known as «radiosensitivity» research. 
Brookhaven’s first gamma field came into use in 1948, with a relatively small 
source of Cobalt-60, producing just 16 curies of radiation. When he and 
others ramped up this work in the 1950s, Sparrow noted that there was 
almost no information available about the effects of radioactive fallout from 
nuclear tests, and certainly none about the expected radiation effects of a 
nuclear war on the natural environment. What information existed was not 
plant-specific. So, Sparrow set out to study the effects of radiation exposure 
to many different kinds of plants, at varying degrees of radiation exposure, 
using Cobalt sources producing thousands of curies. These studies were 
designed to understand how what load of radiation could be absorbed by 
 12. Smith, Luther. A rare dominant chlorophyll mutant in durum wheat. Journal of Heredity. 1952; 
43 (3): 125-128.
 13. Manchester, n. 11, p. 288, 284.
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trees, crops, and foliage in the event of nuclear catastrophe, or of long-term 
exposure to continuous doses of radiation 14.
Despite the press coverage about this radiosensitivity research, mutation 
plant breeding per se did not enjoy widespread financial support in the 
US or Europe, either from atomic energy establishments or among plant 
breeders. It did not substantially expand beyond the framework of nuclear 
weapons effects. The gamma field at Brookhaven yielded only marginally 
interesting results. Some peach mutants were ripening faster than usual, 
and they managed to get clingstone peaches to grow on freestone peach 
trees. Since baby food producers preferred clingstones, this was advertised 
as good news 15. However, most plant breeders felt that there were already 
plenty of varieties existing in nature, and that the most promising paths 
lay in hybridization of existing traits, not mutating new ones. Even at 
Brookhaven, the new traits were scientific curiosities, side stories to the 
main narrative of exposure to nuclear radiation. The studies were not 
designed to feed people in the developing world. Yet the drama of the 
story was nearly irresistible: gamma fields and other centers for radiation-
induced mutation were designed to wrest, rather than await, favors from 
nature. For the research to continue, mutation plant breeding would need 
institutional support that was just as enthusiastic, and willing to make 
optimistic projections, as were writers for popular magazines. They would 
get precisely that from the IAEA.
3. Empire-building at the International Atomic Energy Agency
The widespread diplomatic support enjoyed by the IAEA in the mid-
1950s, especially from the US and United Kingdom, made it an attractive 
place to pursue atomic energy applications in agriculture 16. The agency 
itself was a direct result of 1953 Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech and 
subsequent initiative to create a peaceful atomic energy agency 17. At the 
 14. Sparrow, Arnold H. Research uses of the gamma field and related radiation facilities at Brookhaven 
National Laboratory. Radiation Botany. 1966; 6 (5): 377-405.
 15. Manchester, n. 11, p. 108.
 16. See Karin Zachmann’s work, especially in present issue of Dynamis.
 17. For an extensive account of the enthusiasm for radioisotopes in the postwar era, Creager, Angela 
N. H. Life atomic: a history of radioisotopes in science and medicine. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press; 2013.
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first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held 
in Geneva in 1954, several agricultural experiments were on display. One 
was the «White Sim» carnation, in which the typical red streak apparently 
had been wiped clean, giving the appearance of a pure white flower. A 
Brookhaven creation, the White Sim stood out among many other examples 
that promised a future of pretty flowers, early harvests, abundant timber, 
and foods of endless variety 18.
The efforts of the IAEA to prop up mutation breeding flew in the face 
of considerable skepticism among its advisors, who saw it as a boutique 
field of fringe interest to plant breeders. Agricultural specialists at FAO 
(prior to 1964) and in most countries belittled it as unproven and wasteful 
compared to conventional breeding methods 19. Perry R. Stout, a professor 
of soil science at the University of California, was one of several who 
told the agency to focus on fertilizer studies, not plant breeding. With 
radioisotopes, the pathways of fertilizer could be monitored in soil, with 
an eye toward making the flow of nutrients as efficient as possible. Like 
others, Stout was wary of the IAEA’s commitment to mutation breeding 
in the developing world 20.
In the first few years of the IAEA, fertilizer work did rank high on 
the list of priorities, along with some attempts at disinfesting grain and 
sterilizing insects to control diseases (the sterile male technique). Scientists 
doubted whether mutation breeding could live up to the hype. «Except in 
very favorable cases», British radiobiologist R. Scott Russell pointed out, 
«the labour involved in selecting the valuable mutations from the much 
larger number of useless ones is a formidable task» 21. Similarly, Cambridge 
plant breeder G. D. H. Bell wrote to colleagues at the IAEA:
«Personally I feel that the application of any method for the artificial 
induction of mutations is more in the nature of being an interesting scientific 
 18. Manchester, n. 11. 
 19. Hamblin, Jacob Darwin. Let there be light… and bread: the United Nations, the developing 
world, and atomic energy’s green revolution. History and Technology. 2009; 25: 25-48.
 20. Perry R. Stout (University of California) to Harold H. Smith (IAEA), 31 Dec 1958, IAEA Archives, 
SC/822 PT I.
 21. R. Scott Russell (Agricultural Research Council, Radiobiological Laboratory, Wantage) to K. C. 
Tsien (Department of Research and Isotopes, IAEA), 12 Jan 1960, IAEA Archives, SC/735-1. 
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experiment rather than directly useful in the economic sense of the term, i.e. 
the production of improved varieties» 22.
Bell put greater confidence in traditional methods, namely selecting 
the best of the existing varieties and/or hybridizing them. Bell tried to be 
positive about the IAEA’s work but wrote adamantly that there was no 
good evidence to suggest that mutation plant breeding made economic 
sense. Similarly, scientists at the US’s Brookhaven National Laboratory were 
dismissive about the usefulness of gamma fields for economically important 
agricultural research. Harold H. Smith wrote, «With regard to general 
agricultural usefulness of gamma fields in underdeveloped countries, I have 
grave doubts». He argued that this kind of work was best left to countries 
with high levels of technical competence and agricultural development 23.
With all this advice against promoting mutation breeding in developing 
countries, IAEA administrators faced a dilemma. What if scientists were 
unwilling to listen to advice, and wished to pursue atomic solutions despite 
arguments against? In other words, what if they were building their own 
empires back home? The IAEA had solicited these opinions because a 
Japanese scientist, Kiyoshi Kawara, was trying to create a government-
sponsored National Gamma Field, to be used for agricultural research under 
the auspices of Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. IAEA Deputy 
Director-General Henry Seligman told Kawara that most experts believed 
gamma fields were unlikely to lead to economically important results. But 
this did not deter Kawara, who already was committed to the national 
program. He acknowledged that gamma fields were unlikely to solve plant 
breeding problems; he agreed that other sources of radiation (like X-Rays) 
often did a better job of inducing mutations; and he conceded that gamma 
field programs were expensive to maintain. But with perennial plants, Kawara 
wrote to Seligman, gamma fields might prove useful for breeding. By the 
time he wrote, his title had become «Director, the National Gamma Field» 24.
Scientists at the IAEA carefully observed Kawara’s strategy and soon 
learned from it. He had used the prestige of external support to justify 
 22. G. D. H. Bell (Cambridge Univesity) to K. C. Tsien (Department of Research and Isotopes, IAEA), 
12 Jan 1960, IAEA Archives, SC/735-1.
 23. Harold H. Smith (Brookhaven National Laboratory, USA) to K. C. Tsien (Department of Research 
and Isotopes, IAEA), 27 Jan 1960, IAEA Archives, SC/735-1.
 24. Kiyoshi Kawara (Director, the National Gamma Field, Japan) to Henry Seligman (Deputy Director 
General, Department of Research and Isotopes, IAEA), 13 May 1960, IAEA Archives, SC/735-1.
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soliciting support from his own government. The US Atomic Energy 
Commission in 1957 had offered to provide Japan, free of cost, with a 
200-curie cobalt source to make a gamma field. Having received this 
encouragement from the US, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
convened a panel to decide the future of the gamma field, and it used the 
prodding from the US to justify a different design for the gamma field, 
to acquire a much larger source of gamma radiation (17 pieces of Co-60 
producing more than 2,000 curies), and to generate government funding for 
it. In the end Japan even declined the «magnanimous offer» from the US. By 
the time it opened in 1962, the facility had cost 230 million Yen ($640,000). 
Kawara announced that the Japanese were in the process of exposing just 
about every conceivable plant to gamma radiation, and that there already 
were promising new mutations in roses, carnations, and other flowers 25.
Kawara’s experience highlighted a new opportunity to use the prestige 
of the IAEA to lend credibility to scientists’ programs and help them build 
scientific communities at home. This is precisely what began to happen 
when Icelandic botanist Björn Sigurbjörnsson took a post at the IAEA. 
Sigurbjörnsson, a former student of Åke Gustafsson, wanted to develop a 
coordinated international program of mutation plant breeding, to focus on 
improving rice. He set his sights on Asia, and the first direction he turned 
was toward Japan. By 1964 Kawara’s gamma field had been operational for 
three years, and Sigurbjörnsson hoped that the Japanese scientists there 
would be ideal collaborators in establishing an Asian-focused research 
program in mutation plant breeding. But he also hoped to reach out to 
scientists at the International Rice Research Institute in Philippines, as 
well as researchers in Thailand and India. His goal was to build, through 
modest grants, a system of researchers on plant mutation connected to 
the IAEA, and to create a kind of mutagen pool to which all participants 
might have access 26.
With all this interest, Sigurbjörnsson was struck with a brilliant idea to 
extend the IAEA’s role: the creation of an «International Mutation Group» 
that would include not only developing countries but anyone at all working 
on methods to produce and use induced mutations in plant breeding. It 
 25. Kawara, Kiyoshi. Introduction of a gamma field in Japan. Radiation Botany. 1963; 3: 175-177.
 26. Björn Sigurbjörnsson to Sumumu Nishigaki, 8 May 1964, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT I. See 
also Björn Sigurbjörnsson to Y. Yamasaki (National Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Japan), 
11 May 1964, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT I.
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would be organized by the IAEA, with annual conferences and a printed 
information circular 27. Rather than see the developing world’s enthusiasm 
as a problem —one based on unrealistic expectations— he saw it as an 
opportunity to revitalize the downtrodden programs in richer countries.
What made the plan brilliant was Sigurbjörnsson’s contract strategy, 
which exploited industrialized countries’ existing commitments to IAEA 
programs. He offered a special kind of contract from the IAEA, dubbed 
the «cost-free» contract, targeting scientists in industrialized countries. In 
theory these would be contracts in name only, involving no expenditure 
on the part of the IAEA. Although some scientists wondered why on earth 
they might want such a thing, others caught on right away. A «cost-free» 
contract would give the appearance of support from the IAEA, lending 
prestige and relevance to scientists’ work back home, opening a door for 
government funding, shoring up home university support, and possibly 
leading to other patrons taking an interest. Sigurbjörnsson was offering 
the indirect benefits of an IAEA support without actually paying anything.
The strategy leveraged the prestige of the IAEA to lend legitimacy 
to mutation plant breeding among scientists threatened with diminished 
funding. In a letter to an American colleague, Sigurbjörnsson was quite 
explicit about the reason behind the «cost-free» contracts, referring to the 
German breeder Horst Gaul. «This thing started as a way to help Horst get 
money to continue his research after the AEC called it quits» he wrote. «The 
idea was that the Agency could give him moral support by awarding him 
a “cost-free” contract and by dropping the right hint in the right places». 
Sigurbjörnsson then decided to think of it as a way to bolster support for 
an international group of researchers that had been sidelined in their home 
countries 28. In another letter, Sigurbjörnsson described how he had used 
his office to support mutation breeding for the Germans Horst Gaul and 
Werner Gottschalk:
«The “developed” (rich?) Member States of the Agency have officially 
declared that they are willing to do research as part of the Agency’s programmes 
 27. The «cost-free» concept is in Björn Sigurbjörnsson to Arne Hagberg, (EUCARPIA, Sweden), 
20 Oct 1974, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT I.
 28. Björn Sigurbjörnsson to R. S. Caldecott (University of Minnesota), 3 Dec 1964, IAEA Archives, 
SC/822 (5) PT I.
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free of charge… As it turns out in practice such contracts can directly increase 
the research budget of the institute in question» 29.
Because the IAEA was financed by the rich countries, its blessing carried 
with it the illusion of scientific support by the most advanced countries.
That illusory support also meant that the IAEA could promote mutation 
plant breeding in the developing world, on the premise that it had the 
strong backing of industrialized countries. The prestige of modern-sounding 
atomic energy, and such an apparently-thriving research community among 
rich countries, meant that there was no shortage of governments from the 
so-called developing world wanting advice for a program in mutation plant 
breeding. Sigurbjörnsson’s office received letters from around the world 
from officials keen on accelerating the process of modernization by applying 
the latest scientific techniques. Newly-communist Cuba, for example, told 
the IAEA that it wanted to start gamma field experiments soon under its 
Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria. This was a new organization created 
by Cuba’s 1959 Agrarian Reform Law, which confiscated and redistributed 
large land holdings throughout Cuba. By 1964 the institute was looking to 
start improving crop yields with radiation 30. To the Cubans and to others, 
Sigurbjörnsson repeated that gamma fields were only likely to yield worthwhile 
results in countries with highly developed plant breeding expertise 31. But 
this did not stop requests for assistance. 
Although its hollow grant system served the purpose of propping up a 
dying research agenda, IAEA administrators were very sensitive to the lack 
of a genuine success, and they craved high-profile success stories from the 
developing world. One of their strategies was to try to tap into the energies of 
the existing hybrid researchers in the Philippines, home of the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI), an organization financed by the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations. Takeshi Kawai and M. S. Swaminathan (mutation 
breeders in Japan and India, both members of Sigurbjörnsson’s group) visited 
IRRI and tried to drum up enthusiasm for the IAEA’s work. Unfortunately, 
by the time they visited in 1966, IRRI already was overwhelmed with the 
 29. Björn Sigurbjörnsson to R. N. H. Whitehouse (Plant Breeding Institute, Cambridge, UK), 10 Dec 
1964, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT I.
 30. Ing. C. L. Ugás Rosso (IRRA, Cuba) to Henry Seligman, 21 May 1964, IAEA Archives, SC/735-1.
 31. An example of the IAEA’s caveats to interested parties is Björn Sigurbjörnsson to Ing. C. L. Ugás 
Rosso (IRRA, Cuba), 24 Jun 1964, IAEA Archives, SC/735-1.
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gene pool provided by nature. As Kawai told Sigurbjörnsson, Jennings and 
his colleagues had «a huge gene source in their excellent collection of rice 
varieties and triple crops in a year enable them to breed new ‘spectacular’ 
varieties in three or four years» 32. They saw little reason to divert energy 
and resources to mutation breeding. 
IRRI scientists were as dismissive as most of the other skeptics about 
radiation as an important tool to achieve their goals. The American Peter 
Jennings, the lead plant breeder there, had since 1961 been trying to amass 
a significant collection of germplasm. He and colleague T. T. Chang had 
sent requests to institutes and experimental stations in dozens of countries, 
trying to build upon their meager collection of about three hundred 
varieties. He later recalled the surprising result: «I guess within two or 
three years we had, well I suppose several thousand accessions». For IRRI, 
it was an exciting time for breeding rice —figuring out how to make hybrids 
efficiently, how to break dormancy in grains, and trying to imagine what an 
ideal high-yielding plant might look like. They already had identified one 
particular hybrid that resembled the ideal —a high-yielding variety called 
IR8 33. That high-yielding variety, IR8, became a huge success story in Asia. 
It became the cornerstone, for rice, of the Green Revolution in Asia 34. There 
was little room, and no need, for mutation breeding in their work. Further, 
mutation breeders seemed to have missed the proverbial boat, because the 
new miracle grains were unconnected to radiation work. That would not 
prevent them from trying to claim a few successes.
4. Claiming victories
Despite not playing a part in developing the so-called miracle grains making 
news in the 1960s, mutation breeders at the IAEA were determined to claim a 
role in the Green Revolution. They did so by making audacious claims about 
the quality of radiation-induced varieties of grain. One of these supposed 
success stories was in durum wheat, or «hard» wheat, typically used for 
 32. T. Kawai to Björn Sigurbjörnsson, 16 Mar 1966, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT II.
 33. Interview with Peter Jennings, conducted by Gene Hettel, 20 Jul 2007. Available at http://
archive.irri.org/publications/today/Jennings.asp [accessed 3 Nov, 2010].
 34. International Rice Research Institute, press release, «Institute Names a New Rice Variety», 28 
Nov 1966, IAEA Archives, SC/894-1. 
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pasta, couscous, and the bulgur often found in Middle East dishes such as 
tabbouleh. The Italian standard was an old variety called Cappelli, which 
was high-yielding by the standards of times past. However, in recent years 
Italian farmers had made intensive use of chemical fertilizer, introducing 
new kinds of bread wheat that responded well to it. When such fertilizer 
was applied to the Cappelli wheat, it grew taller and often «lodged», bending 
over or breaking. The fertilizer actually decreased yields. Attempts to 
cross Cappelli with lodging-resistant varieties failed to produce the same 
tasty Italian pasta. However, scientists at the nuclear research center in 
Casaccia treated Cappelli seeds with neutron bombardment. In doing so, 
they produced many mutations and could select those with shorter and/or 
stronger stems, while still holding onto many of the other desired qualities 
of Cappelli. In the IAEA’s telling of events, the two most successful mutants 
from this, Castelfusano and Castelporziano, were shorter and stronger than 
Cappelli, and —because of the fertilizer— higher-yielding than Cappelli. 
Sigurbjörnsson wrote, «their grain quality remains nearly the same as that 
of Cappelli for one of the mutants; the other has a quality that is lower but 
still acceptable» 35.
This was the IAEA’s version of a success story.
To explore these supposed improvements, in the 1960s, FAO and 
IAEA sponsored the planting of several irradiated varieties of the durum 
wheat. Although it seemed promising to the IAEA, it did not always fit the 
interests of local populations. In Egypt, for example, plant breeders were 
looking for ways to improve bread wheat, not durum wheat. In Iran, where 
wheat and barley were the most important crops, scientists had failed to 
find ways to increase yields without planting varieties requiring substantial 
amounts of fertilizer and water. 
In other places, such as Israel and Turkey, the durum wheat mutants 
were faring well compared to local varieties. Sigurbjörnsson encouraged 
scientists in these countries to apply to the IAEA for aid. If any of these 
varieties could be shown as viable, it would be a great boon to the IAEA, 
and bolster the credibility of the science. So he helped them to write their 
grant applications, even giving them template wording along the lines of 
«The International Trials of Durum Wheat Mutants run by the Agency and 
 35. Sigurbjörnsson, Björn. Quickening the pulse of nature. IAEA Bulletin. 1971; 13 (4): 20-27.
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the FAO […] have shown the value of induced mutations for improvement 
of yield and lodging resistance in wheat» 36.
In their efforts to persuade developing countries that there were 
promising mutants to use, IAEA scientists met fierce resistance from within 
their own ranks. Botanist Ronald Silow, on staff at FAO, had begun to issue 
strong statements against the entire program on induced mutations. The 
agency’s official report on the durum wheat trials stated that the mutants 
tested in nine countries in North Africa and the Middle East had out-yielded 
all local and other common varieties. Silow wrote to Sigurbjörnsson:
«That statement is patently contrary to the scientific evidence available 
[…] from those trials and should be deleted. From that statement member 
governments are being led to the false conclusion that radiation-induced 
mutation has already provided varieties of wheat better than any other varieties 
available to farmers in that wide region» 37.
Silow argued for more objective statements from IAEA and FAO, 
since anything they might say on the subject would likely influence many 
governments’ policies. Silow hoped the 1964 merger of two FAO and IAEA 
groups (both on atomic energy applications in agriculture) would help tone 
down these claims, but he was wrong. In fact, Silow himself faced hostility 
from IAEA, his career plummeted, and his criticisms were quashed 38.
A few key scientists in developing countries were building impressive 
research programs and the IAEA gave them as much political support 
as possible. In India, Swaminathan was swiftly gaining notoriety for his 
and others’ work increasing the protein content of wheat by raising lysine 
content. He had taken some of the new wheat varieties developed at the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, in Mexico, and had 
begun to irradiate them. One of the results was a new variant of Sonora-64 
wheat (now renamed Sharbati Sonora) that was amber-colored. This he 
deemed a success because it looked more like the wheat that Indians normally 
consumed, and thus was likely to attract more consumers than the wheat 
imported from the Mexico breeding center. Moreover, it appeared to be 
high in protein and lysine, an essential amino acid found in higher levels 
 36. Björn Sigurbjörnsson to Henry Seligman, 2 May 1967, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT IV.
 37. R. A. Silow to B. Sigurbjörnsson, 18 Jul 1967, IAEA Archives, O/251 PT II. 
 38. For a detailed discussion of Silow’s dissent, and the competing aims of FAO and IAEA, Hamblin, 
n. 19.
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in animal proteins rather than plants. In 1967 Swaminathan claimed that 
these levels were nearly comparable to the lysine found in milk protein. 
Because such protein was crucial for child brain development, he wrote, 
Sharbati Sonora wheat offered a cheap and practical way of «diminishing 
the threat of intellectual dwarfism» 39. At last, the IAEA seemed to have a 
truly impressive success story in an ideal region of the world: radiation had 
paved the way to addressing protein deficiency in India, a country under 
immense population pressure.
Skeptics argued that this approach —trying to improve protein content—
came at a high cost. As one researcher, R. O. Whyte, put it,
«I am concerned that the present stress on the protein content of cereals 
as the answer to Asia’s problems is not giving due account to the equally 
important role of vitamins, minerals and fats, nor to the question of the 
relative merits of plant and animal protein in the Asian diet» 40.
Whyte pointed out that India’s stress on raising lysine content might 
disrupt the balance of other essential amino acids in the grain. It seemed 
as if the IAEA simply wanted scientists to get a mutant with increased 
protein content, ignoring all the other factors.
Scientists at the IAEA had quick answers to this and all other objections. 
Vitamins, minerals, and fats could be added as dietary supplements. And 
rather than assess the relative merits of animal and plant protein in Asians’ 
diets, FAO/IAEA joint division official Robert A. Luse noted, the simplest 
course was to improve protein in existing dietary staples. If people were 
willing to buy wheat, then it made sense to alter it to suit dietary needs 
rather than try to convince people to buy something different 41. This was 
precisely what Swaminathan was supposedly adept at doing —altering 
something that already was accepted by consumers. 
By that time, Björn Sigurbjörnsson had become deputy director of the 
entire FAO/IAEA joint division, so his purview included other fields than 
mutation plant breeding. Others filled his shoes, notably Luse, a Berkeley-
trained agricultural chemist under whom the IAEA became a stalwart 
 39. Hanlon, n. 2.
 40. R. O. Whyte to Robert A. Luse (Plant Breeding and Genetics Section, Joint FAO/IAEA Division), 
3 oct 1968, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT V.
 41. Robert A. Luse to R. O. Whyte (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd.), 24 Oct 
1968, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (5) PT V.
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defender of Swaminathan’s approach to plant improvement by increasing 
protein content. Luse argued that there were millions of people on the edge 
of starvation who had little access —or little money— to pay for animal 
protein. Research on increasing protein —whether by finding mutations, 
hybridizing existing ones, or inducing new ones with radiation— seemed 
to be the path toward helping the poorest people of the world 42.
Finding out that scientists could use atomic energy to compel nature to 
provide more protein amidst a population crisis would have been important. 
The studies turned heads not only in the developing world, but also in leading 
research centers where mutation breeding was no longer taken seriously. 
In 1969 the IAEA received an almost apologetic letter from Robert Rabson 
of the US Atomic Energy Commission, which had downplayed mutation 
plant breeding over the previous decade. He said that he had been surprised 
that now their American contractors were interested in finding ways to 
stimulate yield with radiation. «So you see we are getting drawn into the 
question just a little further with time» 43.
Upon closer inspection, the protein results could not be verified. 
Swaminathan gradually backed off his claim, and eventually the IAEA 
did too. Within the agency, at least one employee (Silow) tried to hold 
Sigurbjörnsson and his colleagues accountable for prematurely announcing 
the finding. But the agency rallied against him and he was successfully 
marginalized. In the end, what began as a strong claim about directing 
nature to solve the protein crisis was soon downgraded to a convenient 
change of color that suited the market better. The professional casualties 
were those who tried to speak up —Silow, the marginalized employee, and 
Shah, who ultimately committed suicide 44.
The political stakes had been high. Joseph Hanlon later argued in The 
New Scientist, «On an international level, the most dramatic effect of Sharbati 
Sonora was to save the flagging FAO/IAEA atomic energy programme». 
But that was just one of the political stakeholders, among whom were 
Swaminathan and other mutation breeders all over the world, politicians 
wanting to claim top notch peaceful atomic energy programs in their own 
 42. Luse, Robert A. Plant protein improvement: a partial solution to the problem of protein 
malnutrition. Kalamazoo College Review. 1973; 35 (3): 3-6.
 43. Robert Rabson (Assistant Chief, Biology Branch, Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC) to 
Maurice Fried (Director, FAO/IAEA Joint Division), 25 Apr 1969, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (4).
 44. Hamblin, n. 19.
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countries, and of course an American foreign policy that had promoted 
peaceful atoms for nearly two decades. Shah addressed his suicide note to 
Swaminathan, complaining of many inequities in the laboratory. «I think the 
time has come again that a scientist will have to sacrifice his life in disgust 
so that other scientists may get proper treatment», he wrote. Perhaps more 
inflammatory was his claim that «a lot of unscientific data are collected 
and passed on to you to fit your line of thinking». The tragic event sparked 
an outcry in the scientific community and beyond, provoking the Indian 
government to conduct an inquiry into the activities of the Indian Council 
for Agricultural Research, of which Swaminathan now was director 45.
Assessing the previous decade’s work, Sigurbjörnsson wrote in 1971 
that the attitude among plants breeders toward radiation-induced mutations 
ranged between over-enthusiasm to skepticism. Trying to seem objective, 
he wrote «Our Joint Division of the FAO and IAEA has attempted to steer 
a middle course between these views» 46. This was not the case at all. The 
IAEA was a global lifeline for a scientific program in jeopardy.
5. Conclusion
Combining the population-explosion rhetoric of environmentalists and the 
humanitarian ethos of FAO, the IAEA scientists turned a tiny, marginalized 
research field into a critical component in the narrative of the Green 
Revolution. They had found shade under a big tent. In his Nobel Peace Prize 
lecture in 1970, plant breeder Norman Borlaug implored governments and 
scientists to invest heavily in agricultural research to address the population 
crisis, including mutation plant breeding, rather than in nuclear arms for the 
destruction of humanity 47. IAEA scientists tried to ride the wave of this clarion 
call from the principal celebrity of the Green Revolution as best they could, 
pointing to Sharbati Sonora, the durum wheat trials in the Mediterranean 
region, and a high-yielding Japanese rice called Reimei 48. Because numerous 
 45. Hanlon, n. 2.
 46. Sigurbjörnsson, n. 27. 
 47. Borlaug, Norman. The green revolution, peace, and humanity. Nobel Lecture, 11 Dec 1970. 
Available from: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1970/borlaug-lecture.html. 
 48. Maurice Fried (Director, FAO/IAEA Joint Division) to E. J. Wellhausen (Director-General, International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center), 23 Dec 1968, IAEA Archives, SC/822 (4).
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crop varieties around the world had been altered by radiation treatment, 
the IAEA attempted to insert these as successes within the narrative of the 
Green Revolution. Most of these accomplished the same feat as the Italian 
durum wheats —increasing the stiffness of a stem, or making it shorter, so 
that vast increases in fertilizer inputs could be maintained without making 
plants fall under their own weight. Other traits included early maturity or 
disease resistance. These were rarely improvements in nutritional quality. 
Most of the success stories were subjective, as in the aesthetics of ornamental 
flowers. And most of those were from X-Ray treatments, not from gamma 
sources requiring radioactive materials. The IAEA claimed radiation was 
responsible for saving peppermint from extinction —because American 
researchers had used it to produce disease-resistant varieties 49. 
Åke Gustafsson, then the grand old man of mutation breeding, went 
so far as to say that the Green Revolution was just the first step in Green 
Evolution. After all, mutations were the source of genetic variability. Most 
of that variability occurred naturally, spontaneously due to several causes 
such as radiation from space, over long stretches of time. But with modern 
technology —and particularly with induced radiation— that process could 
be directed and sped up. Björn Sigurbjörnsson wrote in 1971 that the work 
of the IAEA was «quickening the pulse of nature». Radiation promised to 
speed up the rate of spontaneous mutation to give researchers a larger 
number to work with 50.
Swaminathan went on to great fame and influence. He would become 
director of the IRRI —the very organization that first had dismissed the 
importance of radiation-induced mutation breeding. For decades, he sustained 
a reputation as a major figure in the Green Revolution. He received the 
General Foods World Food Prize in 1987 —along with its hefty reward, 
$200,000. He later went into politics in India and, in a 2009 retrospective 
interview in Science, was dubbed a «guru of the Green Revolution» 51.
In the 1980s, when he had become the director of the FAO/IAEA joint 
division, Sigurbjörnsson again adapted to the times, saying that the Green 
Revolution had laid to rest the population doomsaying of the 1970s. Despite 
what Malthus had predicted, food production had outpaced population 
 49. Radiation and the green revolution. IAEA Bulletin. 1969; 11 (5): 16-27. 
 50. Sigurbjörnsson, n. 27. 
 51. Havener, Robert D. Scientists: their rewards and humanity. Science. 1987; 237 (4820): 1281; A 
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growth. «From the very beginning of this green revolution», he wrote, «nuclear 
techniques played a significant role». By this he meant not only mutation 
breeding, but also using radioactive tracers for fertilizer studies, and for 
programs in food preservation and insect control. But for Sigurbjörnsson 
and the other experts who carved out a world of support at the IAEA, the 
important thing was to impress upon the world the importance of mutation 
breeding in the Green Revolution:
«At the present time, nearly 1,000 crop varieties derived from radiation-
induced mutations are grown worldwide on several million hectares. If all 
varieties with mutants in their parentage are counted, the number reaches 
possibly tens of millions. The annual economic gains are measured in billions 
of dollars» 52.
If the IAEA were to be believed, mutation plant breeding was one of 
the world’s greatest blessings, having ameliorated an environmental crisis 
and elevated the lives of millions. That it could make such claims is not a 
mark of genuine impact. Instead, it is a testament to the IAEA’s deliberate 
attempts, through the efforts of a cadre of officials beginning in the 1960s, 
to elevate the status of mutation plant breeding, first supporting a small 
transnational community of researchers in industrialized countries, and 
then trying to bolster the field’s legitimacy by claiming victories for atomic 
energy in aiding the developing world. It pursued these aims against the 
advice of its advisors, against internal dissent, and in the face of its own 
failures, painstakingly protecting the idea of agricultural improvement 
through atomic energy. œ
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